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The postwar period began in an atmosphere of doubt and fear. Many
economists believed that the nation would slip back into the deep reces-
sion from which it had escaped only as the war began. In the decade
between 1929 and 1939, real gross national product (GNP) had not
grown at all, and the official unemployment rate had reached one-fourth
of the labor force. During the war, the economy had returned to full or
overfull use of its capacity: real GNP rose 75 percent between 1939
and 1944, while the unemployment rate fell to less than 2 percent. Even
many optimists worried that demobilization and the transition to a civil-
ian economy would lead to a new period of long-term stagnation caused
by inadequate demand.
Real output did decline as the war ended, and the unemployment rate
did begin to rise. Real GNP fell by nearly 20 percent between 1944 and
1947. As ten million men and women left the armed forces, total em-
ployment (civilian and armed forces combined) declined by nearly 10
percent and the unemployment rate rose to nearly 4 percent. But the
fears and doubts of the "secular stagnationists" were unwarranted. After
1947 the economy began a period of remarkable growth and stability.
In the next decade, real GNP rose 45 percent, and in the decade that
followed another 48 percent. In only one of those twenty years did real
GNP fall by as much as 1 percent, and that was in 1954, when military
spending had been sharply reduced. This sustained and rapid expansion
had occurred with a relatively stable price level; the annual rise in the
consumer price index averaged only 2 percent. The first two decades of
the postwar period were a time of unsurpassed economic prosperity,
stability, and optimism.
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The contrast between the strength and achievement of the economy
during those years and its poor record since then signals a major change
in the performance of the economy over the postwar period. At the
aggregate level, real GNP growth slowed from an annual rate of 3.9
percent between 1947 and 1967 to only 2.9 percent between 1967 and
1979. The growth of productivity per man-hour in the private business
sector dropped from an annual rate of 3.2 percent during 1947-67 to
less than 1.5 percent since 1967 and less than 1 percent since 1973. The
average unemployment rate rose from 4.7 percent of the labor force to
5.8 percent. The average rate of consumer price index (CPI) inflation
jumped from 2 percent to 6.7 percent (since 1967) with an acceleration
to an average of nearly 9 percent since 1973 and over 13 percent in
1979. The Standard and Poor's index of common stock prices, an indi-
cator of both after-tax profitability and investors' expectations about the
future of the economy, rose sixfold between 1949 and 1969. Even after
adjusting for the rise in the general consumer price level3 this index of
share prices increased by more than 300 percent. In the decade since
1969, however, the index rose only 10 percent and in constant dollars
fell nearly 50 percent. The poor performance of the economy in recent
years can also be seen at a less aggregate level: a falling share of
national income devoted to net investment and to research and de-
velopment; increasing pressures and risks in the financial sector; low
profitability and an aging stock of plant and equipment in many specific
industries; and a deteriorating performance of United States exports.
There is a strong temptation to regard the poor performance of the
past decade as the beginning of a new long-term adverse trend for the
American economy. It is, however, too early to know whether such an
extrapolation is really warranted. Some of the poor record of the 1970s
has undoubtedly been due to inappropriate macroeconomic policies
adopted during the Vietnam War, to the change in the production policy
of the OPEC cartel, and to other disturbances whose impacts will even-
tually fade away. But the deteriorating performance of the economy
may also have more fundamental causes that will not automatically
recede. Indeed, some of the sources of our performance may now be so
deeply rooted in our social and political system that they cannot be
eliminated even when the causes of the problem become better under-
stood. It is clear that there is little hope of reversing the poor perfor-
mance that has lasted for more than a decade unless the underlying
causes are identified and changed.
Many of the papers and comments in this volume point to the ex-
panded role of government as a major reason, perhaps the major reason,
for the deterioration of our economic performance. The government's
mismanagement of monetary and fiscal policy has contributed to the
instability of aggregate output and to the rapid rise in inflation. Govern-3 The American Economy in Transition: Introduction
merit regulations are a principal cause of lower productivity growth and
of the decline in research and development. The growth of government
income-transfer programs has exacerbated the instability of family life
and perhaps the decline in the birthrate. The low rate of saving and the
slow growth of the capital stock reflect tax rules, macroeconomic poli-
cies, and the growth of social insurance programs.
The expanded role of government has undoubtedly been the most
important change in the structure of the American economy in the post-
war period. The extent to which this major change in structure has been
the cause of the major decline in performance cannot be easily assessed.
This introductory essay is certainly not the place to evaluate just how
much of our recent problem derives from specific government policies
or to assess the positive contributions that government policies have
made during the postwar period. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt
that government policies do deserve substantial blame for the adverse
experience of the past decade. I would like, therefore, to devote these
few pages to examining the general character of government policies and
of government decision-making that causes it to create problems of the
type we have experienced.
Economists generally regard all economic choices as the result of
explicit comparisons of costs and benefits. When an individual buys an
apple rather than a pear, we assume that he has considered the prices
of each and the pleasures that he would expect from the apple and the
pear. Even for more complex choices with uncertain future benefits,
such as an individual's choice among careers or a firm's choice among
investment options, the economist automatically assumes that the deci-
sion-maker has considered the possible costs and benefits of the option
he selects. Individuals and firms may occasionally be surprised by ad-
verse consequences they had not anticipated, but on average the out-
comes should correspond to expectations. Applying such a "rational
choice" view to government policies would imply that successive govern-
ments made deliberate decisions to accept certain adverse consequences
in order to achieve other goals: for example, that the current high infla-
tion was accepted in order to avoid more unemployment; that the low
rates of saving and investment were accepted in order to have tax poli-
cies and transfer programs that could more equally distribute disposable
income; or that the low rate of R&D spending and the fall in productiv-
ity were accepted as a consequence of imposing regulations that could
protect the environment and the safety of workers.
I find this picture of economically rational choice implausible. I find
it much more believable that the adverse consequences of government
policies have been largely the unintended and unexpected by-products
of well-meaning policies that were adopted without looking beyond their
immediate purpose or understanding the magnitudes of their adverseMartin Feldstein
long-run consequences. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were
adopted throughout the past fifteen years in the hope of lowering the
unemployment rate but without anticipating the higher inflation rate
that would eventually follow. High tax rates on investment income were
enacted and the social security retirement benefits were increased with-
out considering the subsequent impact on investment and saving. Regu-
lations were imposed to protect health and safety without evaluating the
reduction in productivity that would result or the effect of an uncertain
regulatory future on long-term R&D activities.
Similarly, I believe the government never considered that raising the
amount and duration of unemployment benefits to the current high levels
to avoid hardship among the unemployed would encourage layoffs and
discourage reemployment; that Medicare and Medicaid, introduced to
help the elderly and the poor, might lead to an explosion in health care
costs; that welfare programs, introduced and expanded to help poor
families, might weaken family structures; or that federal aid through the
tax laws and through special credit programs to encourage homeowner-
ship would have such adverse effects on the cities, precipitating the
relocation of business and consequent poverty and other problems for
those who remained behind. The list of well-meaning policies with unin-
tended adverse consequences could be extended almost without limit.
Moreover, in many cases the adverse consequences have resulted not
from the introduction of fundamentally new programs and policies, but
from the fact that old programs are retained and expanded in a changed
economic environment. Social security and unemployment compensation
were introduced in the 1930s; the differences between the economy then
and now would imply corresponding differences in the likely impact of
these programs. The high rate of unemployment, the lack of investment
demand, and the low rate of personal income tax constituted an environ-
ment in the 1930s in which the side effects of social security and unem-
ployment compensation would be relatively innocuous. Today's tight
labor market, capital scarcity, and high personal tax rates imply that
these programs now impede employment and capital formation. Simi-
larly, our personal and business tax laws were designed for an economy
with little or no inflation. The interaction of this tax structure with the
current high inflation rates causes extremely high effective tax rates on
capital income, a discouragement to saving, and a distortion of invest-
ment away from plant and equipment toward housing and consumer
durables.
Unfortunately, even when the inappropriateness of old policies is
recognized, change is difficult to achieve. Existing programs are main-
tained even though the same programs would not be adopted today.
These programs survive and grow with the help of sympathetic bureau-5 The American Economy in Transition: Introduction
crats and well-organized beneficiary groups. Loyalties develop to the
form of public programs rather than to their basic purpose.
There is a fundamental reason why well-intentioned government poli-
cies often have adverse consequences. The government in its decision-
making is inherently myopic, more myopic than either households or
firms. Political accountability means that a policy will be judged on its
apparent effects within as little as two years. A congressman or senator
may understand the long-run implications of a policy, but the relevance
to him of those long-run effects is very limited if voters look only at the
short-run impact. The political process lacks the equivalent of capital
assets through which private decision-makers are rewarded or penalized
for the long-term consequences of previous decisions. And because the
political process does not reward or punish elected officials for the long-
term consequences of their actions, there is little or no incentive for
these officials to learn about such long-term effects. Political myopia
reflects the public's general inability to anticipate the long-run conse-
quences of political decisions and even to associate those consequences
when they occur with the policies that caused them. It is not surprising
therefore that well-meaning policies frequently have unexpected adverse
consequences and that policies with short-run costs and long-run bene-
fits are not adopted.
The nature of the political decision-making process is perhaps most
apparent in the development of macroeconomic policy. In the early
1960s, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies were pursued in what
might be described as a rational choice based on the Phillips curve
analysis that was then widely accepted by the economics profession. But
later in the decade President Lyndon Johnson rejected the warnings of
his economic advisors that taxes had to be raised in order to avoid an
accelerating rate of inflation. Johnson chose to accept an increased long-
run inflation rate in order to avoid the short-run political cost of a tax
increase. His choice, while perhaps politically rational, was economically
myopic. During the 1970s, the government and the monetary authorities
focused on the short-run goal of reducing unemployment through expan-
sionary policies that served only to exacerbate the inflationary situation.
If escaping from the current high rate of inflation requires a sustained
period of increased unemployment and economic slack, the shortsighted-
ness of the political process may make this very difficult to achieve.
The myopia of the political process is also reflected in policies that
discriminate against saving and investment. It is significant that pro-
investment legislation has always been justified as a way of stimulating
short-run demand and thereby reducing current unemployment. There
has been little effective support for policies to increase saving and invest-
ment in order to expand the capital stock and raise future income. InMartin Feldstein
contrast, tax and transfer policies that favor current public and private
consumption have been favored. The long-run benefits of increasing the
capital stock apparently lie beyond the political horizon.
If the electoral process makes political decisions inherently myopic,
we should recognize this as an intrinsic feature of our democracy. It is
important, moreover, to consider this bias in political decision-making
in determining the extent of the role that government should play in our
economic life.
Of course, politicians do not have a monopoly on myopia. But al-
though some of the political shortsightedness is undoubtedly a response
to constituent pressures, the myopia of the political process actually
encourages voters to be impatient. Voters demand faster results from
the political process than they demand from private activities because
they recognize that elected officials are accountable only in the short run.
Politicians' promises of "quick-fix" solutions to major social and eco-
nomic problems also induce voters to expect such solutions and to judge
incumbents and candidates by a short-run standard.
The policies that are adopted also bias individuals to be more short-
sighted and impatient in their private decisions. Tax policies, credit
market rules, and social insurance programs encourage current consump-
tion and a decrease in private provisions for the future. In more subtle
ways, government programs that substitute the state for the family cause
behavior that weakens the development of the future population: fewer
births, more unmarried individuals, more childless couples, and more
divorced parents. Of course, to some extent, these government policies
may only reflect a growing impatience in the public that stems from
other sources. It is impossible to identify the relative importance of
different factors, but the government clearly bears substantial responsi-
bility for encouraging and stimulating shortsighted behavior.
To the extent that the poor economic performance of the past decade
can be traced to the growing role of government and the inherent myopia
of the political process, improvement of our performance will be difficult
to achieve. Difficult but not impossible. The public's support for environ-
mental protection and for expenditure on research and development
shows that programs with long-run benefits can be politically viable.
There are at present some signs of growing public and governmental
interest in increasing the rate of capital formation. The Keynesian fear
of saving that has dominated thinking on this subject for more than
thirty years is finally giving way to a concern about the low rates of
productivity increase and of investment. The public has also recognized
that the key problem for macroeconomic policy is now inflation, not
unemployment. If the public begins to see more clearly the links between
current policies and future consequences, there will be less reason to fear
the unexpected consequences of myopic decisions.7 The American Economy in Transition: Introduction
The 1970s have been a decade of frustrated expectations. The size
and influence of the government have grown rapidly, but the public's
distrust of government has grown even more rapidly. The economics
profession has discovered a new humility as the economy's performance
has worsened. As the 1980s begin, there is widespread anxiety about
the future. Will this decade be a period of severe economic problems
with a major recession, accelerating inflation, or both? Or can the poor
economic performance of the 1970s be reversed? The current data on
the developing state of the economy are not clear. And, while some
events may be outside our control, the success of the economy in the
current decade and in the remainder of this century will depend also on
whether we choose wisely as we reevaluate and restructure our major
economic policies.